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OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 Marie Schaub, her daughter Doe 1, and the Freedom 
From Religion Foundation (“FFRF”) (collectively, 
“Appellants”) brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 
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that the New Kensington-Arnold School District (“the 
District”) violates the Establishment Clause by maintaining a 
monument of the Ten Commandments at its public high 
school.  The District Court granted the District’s summary 
judgment motion, concluding that the Appellants lack 
standing and their request for injunctive relief is moot.  
Because Schaub has standing to seek both nominal damages 
and injunctive relief, and her request for injunctive relief is 
not moot, we will reverse the District Court’s order 
dismissing her claims.  We will vacate the order dismissing 
FFRF’s claims to allow the District Court to consider whether 
Schaub was a member of FFRF at the time the complaint was 
filed.  As to Doe 1, we need not address whether she has 
standing to obtain an injunction, but conclude that the District 
Court correctly found that she lacks standing to seek nominal 
damages, and we will affirm the order granting the District 
summary judgment with respect to this claim. 
 
I 
 
 In 1956, the New Kensington Fraternal Order of the 
Eagles, a non-profit charitable organization, donated a six-
foot granite monument inscribed with the Ten 
Commandments to be placed on the grounds of Valley High 
School in New Kensington.  The donation was part of a 
nationwide program spearheaded by the Eagles’ Youth 
Guidance Committee through which local chapters of the 
organization donated over 140 such monuments.  The 
Committee believed that troubled young people would benefit 
from exposure to the Ten Commandments as a code of 
conduct.  In addition to the text of the Ten Commandments, 
the tablet is adorned with images of an eagle, an American 
flag, the Star of David, the Chi-Rho symbol, a Masonic eye, 
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and tablets with Hebrew and Phoenician lettering. 
 
 The monument is located near the entrance to the high 
school’s gymnasium, which is accessible from the student 
parking area via two railed footpaths.  Anyone entering the 
school via these paths passes within 15 feet of the monument.  
The parties disagree about how closely one must approach the 
monument in order to read its text.   
 
 On March 20, 2012, FFRF, an organization dedicated 
to promoting separation of church and state, wrote a letter to 
the Superintendent of the District requesting that the 
monument be removed.  The school board rejected the 
request.  Local media reported on the letter and the school 
board’s decision.  Schaub saw one such story on television, 
and contacted FFRF through its website.  She states that she 
has “been a member of FFRF since August 2012, when [she] 
contacted FFRF regarding this lawsuit.”  App. 734.1 
 Schaub and Doe 1 live within the New Kensington-
Arnold School District.  Schaub had visited the high school 
                                                 
1 Schaub was questioned about how she became a 
member of FFRF during her April 2014 deposition, and was 
asked “how long are you a member for?” to which she 
answered, “[t]his year.”  App. 834.  The questioner then said 
“[i]s that all?” and Schaub responded “[y]es, I believe my 
membership expires in 2015.”  App. 834.  The District used 
this exchange to conclude that Schaub was not a member at 
the time the lawsuit was filed in 2012.  The only evidence to 
support the claim that Schaub was a member when the suit 
was filed is her December 2014 declaration, which stated that 
she has “been a member of FFRF since August 2012.”  App. 
734. 
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and come into contact with the monument in the past while 
taking Doe 1 to a karate event, picking Doe 1 up from a 
program at the high school swimming pool, and dropping off 
her sister, whose child attends the high school, to attend 
events at the school once or twice.  In addition, Doe 1 was 
scheduled to attend the high school beginning in August 
2014, and Schaub planned to drive her to school. 
 
 Schaub estimates that from the curb, where she would 
pull over to drop someone off at the gym’s entrance, she 
could see the monument and make out the title, “The Ten 
Commandments” as well as the word “Lord,” which are 
printed in a larger font than the remaining text.  App. 820-22.  
The monument can also be seen from the road on which 
Schaub and Doe 1 frequently travel. 
 
 Schaub did not testify that she ever read the full text of 
the monument, but said that she walked by it and views it as 
“commanding” students and visitors at the high school to 
worship “thy God,” brands her as “an outsider because [she] 
do[es] not follow the particular religion or god that the 
monument endorses,”  App. 679, and makes her “stomach 
turn[ ],” App. 824.  She wishes to bring up her daughter 
without religion and “do[es] not want Doe 1 to be influenced 
by the Ten Commandments monument in front of Valley 
High School.”  App. 680.   
 
 Doe 1, who identifies as non-religious, recalls walking 
past the monument to attend the karate event when she was 
six or seven years old, and to use the high school swimming 
pool between third and fifth grade, but “never read it,” App. 
684, “was young so [she] didn’t really know what it meant,” 
App. 687, and “didn’t really pay attention to it.”  App. 684.  
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She subsequently “looked at it because [her] mom was [ ] 
worried about it” and “wanted to see what it was about.”  
App. 684.  Specifically, Doe 1 testified that she reviewed a 
picture of the monument, and has seen it from the road while 
being driven to a friend’s house.  When asked at her 
deposition about her reaction to the monument, Doe 1 
testified that she “didn’t really feel anything when [she] was 
young,” and right now, does not “feel like [she] ha[s] to 
believe in god, but . . . [that] since it’s there in front of a 
school that they kind of want you to be that way.”2  App. 864.  
Appellants concede the record is silent as to whether Doe 1 
had this view at the time the complaint was filed. 
 
On September 14, 2012, Appellants filed a complaint 
in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania alleging that the presence of the monument on 
public school property violates the Establishment Clause and 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, nominal damages, 
and attorneys’ fees.3  During the pendency of the lawsuit, 
Schaub and Doe 1’s contact and possible contact with the 
monument continued.  Doe 1 attended the eighth grade dinner 
dance at the high school in May 2014, and she expressed an 
interest in attending classes at the Northern Westmoreland 
                                                 
2 While the complaint alleges Doe 1 has “felt anxiety 
over the proposition that the religious monument will” remain 
at the school, Compl. at 6-7, ECF No. 1, the record shows that 
Doe 1 did not state any negative feelings about the 
monument. 
3 Nominal damages are a type of damages awarded for 
the violation of a right “without proof of actual injury.”  
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978). 
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Career & Technology Center, which is located on the high 
school campus. 
 
In August 2014, Schaub sent Doe 1 to a different high 
school, which required her to leave her middle school 
classmates and attend a school farther from Schaub’s home.  
Schaub avows that were the monument removed from Valley 
High School, she would permit Doe 1 to enroll there. 
 
After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  The District Court held that Appellants 
lack standing and, in any event, their claim for injunctive 
relief was moot.  The District Court observed that appellate 
courts require plaintiffs bringing Establishment Clause claims 
to show “direct, unwelcome contact” with the allegedly 
offensive display, but noted that the cases tended to concern 
plaintiffs whose contact with a display was “frequent and 
regular,” and a necessary result of accessing government 
services or fulfilling civic obligations.  App. 14 (quoting 
Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1252 (9th Cir. 
2007)).  As a result, it interpreted these factors as imposing 
additional elements to show standing, and held that Doe 1 and 
Schaub “failed to establish that they were forced to come into 
direct, regular, and unwelcome contact with the Ten 
Commandments monument.”  App. 15 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  As to Schaub, the District Court found that 
she had come into contact with the monument just a few 
times and such exposure was insufficient to confer standing.  
The District Court also found that she had not shown that her 
contact was “required” for “necessary matters” or as “part of 
her regular routine.”  App. 16.  Furthermore, the District 
Court read Schaub’s deposition testimony that “it never 
occur[ed] to [her]” that the monument was wrongful and she 
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“didn’t really think too much about it” when she first saw it to 
mean that her objections to the monument arose only after 
FFRF became involved in the controversy, undermining the 
personal nature of her claims.  App. 16.   
 
As to FFRF, the District Court noted that its 
associational standing was contingent on Schaub’s standing 
and, because she lacked standing, FFRF also lacked standing.  
As to Doe 1, the District Court found her claim was more 
“tenuous” than her mother’s because she did not seem to 
recollect seeing the monument in person or feeling affronted 
by it.  App. 16-17. 
 
The District Court also found that Doe 1’s attendance 
at a different high school was irrelevant to standing because 
standing must exist at the time a complaint was filed, and her 
attendance at a different school occurred at a later time.  The 
District Court viewed her enrollment at a different school, 
however, as mooting the request for injunctive relief because 
the decision to enroll Doe 1 at another school removed any 
threat of future injury from alleged exposure to the 
monument.  Schaub, Doe 1, and FFRF appeal. 
 
II4 
                                                 
 4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
We exercise de novo review over legal conclusions 
concerning standing and mootness.  Perelman v. Perelman, 
793 F.3d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 2015) (standing); Ruocchio v. 
United Transp. Union, Local 60, 181 F.3d 376, 382 (3d Cir. 
1999) (mootness).   
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A 
Standing and mootness are two distinct justiciability 
doctrines that limit our jurisdiction to cases and controversies 
in which a plaintiff has a concrete stake.  Standing ensures 
that each plaintiff has “[t]he requisite personal interest . . . at 
the commencement of the litigation,” while mootness ensures 
that this interest “continue[s] throughout” the duration of the 
case.  Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 
68 n.22 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
To establish constitutional standing, “a plaintiff must 
                                                                                                             
 The District Court, rather than a jury, resolves factual 
issues relevant to determining whether a party has standing.  
See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 
U.S. 59, 72 (1978) (relying on the district court’s factual 
findings from its evidentiary hearing concerning standing 
issues);  N.J. Coal. of Rooming & Boarding House Owners v. 
Mayor & Council of Asbury Park, 152 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir. 
1998) (remanding to the district court for “further factual 
development and a new determination by the district court 
regarding plaintiffs’ standing” because of “insufficient factual 
findings for us to review its standing determination.”).  We 
review those findings for clear error.  Perelman, 793 F.3d at 
373. 
 A plaintiff bears the burden of showing standing in the 
“manner and degree of evidence required at the [particular] 
stage[ ] of the litigation.”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).  Thus, “[a]t the summary judgment 
stage, the plaintiff must produce evidence [of standing] in the 
form of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56[ ] affidavits or documents . . . .”  
ACLU-NJ v. Twp. of Wall, 246 F.3d 258, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
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show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete 
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural 
or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the 
challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.”  Friends of the Earth, Inc. 
v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 
(2000).  The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that 
these requirements are met at the “commencement of the 
litigation,” and must do so “separately for each form of relief 
sought.”  Id. at 170, 184-85.  In assessing standing, our 
primary project is to separate those with a true stake in the 
controversy from those asserting “the generalized interest of 
all citizens in constitutional governance.”  Valley Forge 
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United For Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 483 (1982) (quoting Schlesinger v. 
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 223 n.13 
(1979)).  
 
Mootness “ensures that the litigant’s interest in the 
outcome continues to exist throughout the life of the lawsuit.”  
Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1993).  The 
party asserting that a claim is moot must show that it is 
“absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior [is] not 
reasonably [ ] expected to recur.”  Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 189.  
“[A] court will not dismiss a case as moot,” even if the nature 
of the injury changes during the lawsuit, if “secondary or 
‘collateral’ injuries survive after resolution of the primary 
injury.”  Chong v. Dist. Dir., I.N.S., 264 F.3d 378, 384 (3d 
Cir. 2001); Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 678 
(9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he question is not whether the precise 
relief sought at the time the application for an injunction was 
filed is still available.  The question is whether there can be 
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any effective relief.”).   
We first address what a plaintiff must show to have 
standing to challenge a religious display under the 
Establishment Clause and then examine whether standing 
exists to pursue the remedies sought and whether the 
Appellants’ conduct moots the claim for relief.  
 
B 
 
 Nearly every court of appeals has held that standing in 
this context “requires only direct and unwelcome personal 
contact with the alleged establishment of religion.”5  Red 
River Freethinkers v. City of Fargo, 679 F.3d 1015, 1023 (8th 
Cir. 2012); see also Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 
479, 491 (2d Cir. 2009) (plaintiff who had “direct contact 
with religious displays that were made a part of his 
experience using the postal facility nearest his home” had 
standing); Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1253 (“[S]piritual harm 
resulting from unwelcome direct contact with an allegedly 
offensive religious . . . symbol . . . suffices to confer Article 
                                                 
5 Our Court has issued rulings in cases concerning 
religious displays that are consistent with the view that direct, 
unwelcome contact suffices to confer standing.  See 
Modrovich v. Allegheny Cty., 385 F.3d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 
2004) (not mentioning issue of standing, but noting in passing 
that plaintiffs had alleged “regular, direct and unwelcome” 
contact with religious display); Freethought Soc’y of Greater 
Phila. v. Chester Cty., 334 F.3d 247, 255 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(dismissing in a footnote the argument that plaintiffs who 
viewed religious plaque at courthouse occasionally while 
conducting official business there lacked standing as “not . . . 
convincing”). 
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III standing.”); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Found., 
Inc. v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484, 490 (6th Cir. 2004) (plaintiff 
had standing to challenge display in courtroom because he 
had “direct, unwelcome contact with the Ten Commandments 
display”); Suhre v. Haywood Cty., 131 F.3d 1083, 1086 (4th 
Cir. 1997) (“[D]irect contact with an unwelcome religious 
exercise or display works a personal injury distinct from and 
in addition to each citizen’s general grievance against 
unconstitutional government conduct.”); Foremaster v. City 
of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1490 (10th Cir. 1989) 
(“allegations of direct, personal contact” with religious icon 
in city logo gave rise to standing); Saladin v. City of 
Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 692 (11th Cir. 1987) (standing in 
Establishment Clause cases is established by “direct contact 
with the offensive conduct”).   
 
The District Court appeared to read the direct, 
unwelcome contact standard to include a frequency 
requirement.  This is incorrect.  First, the Supreme Court has 
made clear that “an identifiable trifle is enough for standing 
to fight out a question of principle.”  United States v. Students 
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 
U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973); see also Saladin, 812 F.2d at 691 
(citing SCRAP and concluding that “[t]here is no minimum 
quantitative limit required to show injury”); Am. Civil 
Liberties Union of Ga. v. Rabun Cty. Chamber of Commerce, 
Inc., 698 F.2d 1098, 1108 (11th Cir. 1983) (concluding that 
“the Supreme Court has made it clear that no minimum 
quantitative limit is required to establish injury under either a 
constitutional or prudential analysis”).  Requiring frequent 
contact with the display to obtain standing is inconsistent with 
the concept that a single “trifle” is sufficient to establish 
standing. 
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Second, while many courts have noted the frequency 
of a plaintiff’s actual or expected contact with a religious 
display, the same courts do not include frequency as a 
necessary element when stating the applicable rule.  See, e.g., 
Jewish People for the Betterment of Westhampton Beach v. 
Vill. of Westhampton Beach, 778 F.3d 390, 394 (2d Cir. 
2015) (holding that residents had standing to challenge the 
erection of a Jewish ritual enclosure of a geographic area 
which they would “confront[ ] . . . on a daily basis,” but 
stating that standing is found in the religious display context 
when a plaintiff alleges that he “was made uncomfortable by 
direct contact with religious displays” (quoting Cooper, 577 
F.3d at 491)); Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Found., Inc. 
v. DeWeese, 633 F.3d 424, 429 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that 
plaintiff had “frequently and routinely” come into contact 
with the offensive display, but saying that “‘direct and 
unwelcome’ contact with the contested object demonstrates 
psychological injury in fact sufficient to confer standing”); 
Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1252-53 (noting that plaintiff’s contact 
with display “was frequent and regular, not sporadic and 
remote,” but describing majority test among the courts of 
appeals as “unwelcome direct contact with” a religious 
display); Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1088, 1090 (holding that plaintiff 
who came into contact with Ten Commandments display in 
courtroom during “numerous suits” he was involved with and 
attended public meetings there had standing, but referring to 
“direct unwelcome contact with a religious display” as the 
required standard).  For instance, in Pelphrey v. Cobb County, 
547 F.3d 1263, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2008), the court noted that 
a plaintiff challenging a religious invocation at planning 
commission meetings had attended three meetings in person 
and viewed many on the internet, but concluded that standing 
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existed because “the record allow[ed] an inference that [the 
plaintiff] observed a meeting,” not because he did so 
frequently or regularly.  Id. at 1280.   
In other cases, courts do not describe contact with a 
display as particularly frequent, or omit frequency from the 
discussion completely.  See, e.g., Red River, 679 F.3d at 
1023-24 (not discussing frequency with which plaintiffs came 
into contact with display); Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 
637 F.3d 1095, 1113 (10th Cir. 2010) (same); Books v. 
Elkhart Cty., 401 F.3d 857, 862 (7th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff 
would need to pass display “at least once a year in order to 
pick up a form” as well as if he visited two County 
departments); Doe v. Cty. of Montgomery, 41 F.3d 1156, 
1158 (7th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff came into contact with 
religious display on a few occasions when registering to vote, 
obtaining absentee ballots, and performing jury duty).  While 
frequent contact with a religious display may strengthen the 
case for standing, it is not required to establish standing.  But 
see Green v. Haskell Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 568 F.3d 784, 793 
(10th Cir. 2009) (reciting test that “[a]llegations of personal 
contact with a state-sponsored image suffice to demonstrate . . 
. direct injury” but proceeding to compare the frequency of 
contact with that in other cases (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).6   
 
While frequent contact with a display is not a 
requirement for standing, a passerby who is not a member of 
                                                 
6 Imposing a frequency requirement would also be 
tantamount to endorsing the notion that a plaintiff must cause 
himself increased injury to bring a claim. 
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the community, and who faces no risk of future contact,7 may 
not have an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing.  This 
is because standing requires that the plaintiff has a concrete 
grievance that is particularized to him and that the plaintiff is 
not one simply expressing generalized disagreement with 
activities in a place in which he has no connection.  See 
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 482-83; see also Moss v. 
Spartanburg Cty. Sch. Dist. Seven, 683 F.3d 599, 605 (4th 
Cir. 2012); Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Sch., 33 F.3d 
679, 683 (6th Cir. 1994) (practices in one’s “own community 
may create a larger psychological wound than someplace we 
are just passing through”); Saladin, 812 F.2d at 693 (plaintiffs 
“have more than an abstract interest” where they are “part of 
[the relevant community] and are directly affronted” by a 
religious display).   
 
Moreover, an individual objecting to a religious 
display on government property or religious activity that is 
government-sponsored need not change her behavior to avoid 
contact with the display to establish standing.  Suhre, 131 
F.3d at 1088 (“In evaluating standing, the Supreme Court has 
never required that Establishment Clause plaintiffs take 
affirmative steps to avoid contact with challenged displays or 
religious exercises.”).  Rather, standing exists either when 
plaintiffs “were subjected to unwelcome religious 
exercises or were forced to assume special burdens to avoid 
them.”  Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486 n.22.  Consistent with 
                                                 
7 The risk of future contact is only relevant to the 
question of whether there is standing to seek injunctive and 
declaratory relief, and it does not factor into our analysis of 
whether there is standing to pursue nominal damages.  See 
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983). 
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this approach, the Supreme Court has decided religious 
display cases in which plaintiffs had come into contact with 
the displays but not altered their conduct, without noting any 
concern about their standing to sue.  See Cty. of Allegheny v. 
Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 
U.S. 573 (1989) (challenging a holiday display outside county 
courthouse); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) 
(challenging a holiday display in a city’s shopping district). 
We agree with the view that one should not be 
required to avoid an unwelcome object or activity to have 
standing to bring an Establishment Clause claim.8  See, e.g., 
Red River, 679 F.3d at 1023; Books, 401 F.3d at 857, 861; 
Foremaster, 882 F.2d at 1490; Suhre, 131 F.3d at 1088.  In 
the religious display context, the allegedly unwelcome 
activity generally takes place on government property or at a 
government-sponsored event.  A community member should 
not be forced to forgo a government service to preserve his or 
her ability to challenge an allegedly unconstitutional religious 
display or activity.9  While altering one’s behavior to avoid 
                                                 
 8 As the School District points out, the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suggested in Freedom From 
Religion Found., Inc. v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463 (7th Cir. 1988) 
and Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 
794 F.2d 265, 268-69 (7th Cir. 1986) that altered conduct was 
required to bring an establishment clause claim.  More recent 
Seventh Circuit cases, however, have retreated from this 
view, see Books, 401 F.3d at 857, 861 (noting that other 
Seventh Circuit cases have found standing without altered 
conduct). 
 
9 Similarly, while many cases involve plaintiffs 
availing themselves of needed government services or 
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something may demonstrate that the thing avoided is 
unwelcome, altered conduct is not a prerequisite for obtaining 
standing in this context.10   
 
Thus, a community member like Schaub may establish 
standing by showing direct, unwelcome contact with the 
allegedly offending object or event, regardless of whether 
such contact is infrequent or she does not alter her behavior to 
avoid it.11 
                                                                                                             
fulfilling civic obligations, see, e.g., Cooper, 577 F.3d at 490; 
Books, 401 F.3d at 861; Doe, 41 F.3d at 1161, there is no 
requirement that a plaintiff do so, or that her contact with the 
display be unavoidable.  Furthermore, attending events at a 
public school, whether or not one is a student, is plainly an 
interest that can give rise to the requisite injury for standing 
purposes.  See Washegesic, 33 F.3d at 682 (religious painting 
hung at a public school did “not affect students only” but 
rather, “a member of the public would have standing if she 
attended events in the gymnasium”); Jager v. Douglas Cty. 
Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 826 n.1 (11th Cir. 1989) (former 
student and his father had standing to challenge prayer at 
football games “as people who attend the football games”). 
10 See, e.g., Moss, 683 F.3d at 606-07 (discussing 
plaintiffs’ change of conduct as one of several reasons they 
demonstrated sufficient injury); Cooper, 577 F.3d at 490 
(noting that that “the discomfort [the plaintiff] suffered when 
he viewed the religious displays . . . was so great that he was 
inclined to drive to another postal unit” as one reason that his 
injury was of sufficient seriousness). 
11 A parent sending his or her child to a public school 
in the community also has standing to complain about present 
and future religious displays or activities at the child’s school.  
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C 
 
 A plaintiff seeking relief must show he or she has 
standing for each remedy sought.  Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184.  
Thus, we first examine Schaub and Doe 1’s standing to secure 
nominal damages for injury from past direct, unwelcome 
contact with the monument.  Schaub has cited three specific 
occasions on which she viewed, and hence had direct contact 
with, the monument.  Whether Schaub read the monument 
                                                                                                             
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 584 (1992) (the father of a 
high school freshman had Article III standing to challenge the 
inclusion of a prayer during his daughter’s anticipated high 
school graduation ceremony years later); Sch. Dist. of 
Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963) 
(both children and their parents had standing to challenge 
bible reading in their public school); see also Valley Forge, 
454 U.S. at 486 n.22 (characterizing Schempp as supporting 
standing “because impressionable schoolchildren were 
subjected to unwelcome religious exercises or were forced to 
assume special burdens to avoid them”); Donovan ex rel. 
Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 217 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We do note that parents independently 
have standing to bring constitutional challenges to the 
conditions in their children’s schools.”); Brody ex rel. 
Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1114 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(“parents independently have standing to bring constitutional 
challenges to the conditions in their children’s schools”); Bell 
v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 70 of Cleveland Cty., 766 
F.2d 1391, 1398 (10th Cir. 1985) (agreeing with district court 
that parents may “on their own behalf, assert that the state is 
unconstitutionally acting to establish a religious preference 
affecting their children” (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
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each time she saw it, or ever fully read its text, is immaterial 
since it is the monument’s overall representation of the Ten 
Commandments to which Schaub objects, as she sees it as 
conveying a religious message.  See Saladin, 812 F.2d at 691-
92 (holding that rendering the term “Christianity” as part of a 
city seal, to be illegible did not prevent residents who knew 
what it signified from being reminded of it “every time they 
[were] confronted with” it).  Schaub’s allegations that the 
monument “signals that [she is] an outsider because [she] 
do[es] not follow the particular religion or god that the 
monument endorses,” App. 679, and that her “stomach 
turned” when she encountered it,12 App. 824, are sufficient to 
demonstrate that her contact with the monument was 
unwelcome.  Thus, Schaub has standing to pursue a nominal 
damages claim.   
 
Doe 1, on the other hand, explicitly stated that she did 
not understand the monument when she encountered it prior 
to the lawsuit because she was too young, “never read it or 
paid attention to it,” and never told anyone that it bothered 
her.  App. 684.  In fact, it is not clear from the record that Doe 
1 read or understood the monument until after the suit was 
filed.  See Wall, 246 F.3d at 266 (concluding that plaintiffs 
lacked standing because they failed to describe their reaction 
to a religious display and because it was “unclear whether” 
one plaintiff observed it “in order to describe [it] for this 
litigation” or while going about ordinary business).  As to 
                                                 
12 “[W]hile those injuries are largely emotional, we 
must presume they are sincerely felt.”  Red River, 679 F.3d at 
1024 (noting that there is no basis under Article III’s case-or-
controversy requirement for treating intangible emotional 
harms differently from more readily quantifiable harms). 
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Doe 1’s comment that she later viewed the monument as 
conveying that the school wanted students to subscribe to 
religious beliefs, the record does not show that she had that 
view at the time the complaint was filed.  Thus, we cannot 
say the District Court erred in concluding that Doe 1 lacks 
standing. 
 
D 
 
We next examine whether Schaub and Doe 1 have 
standing to pursue prospective injunctive relief.  At the time 
the complaint was filed, Schaub believed that Doe 1 would 
matriculate at the high school and come into daily contact 
with the monument.  While the record does not establish that 
Doe 1 herself dreaded contact with the monument, she 
asserted that her mother, Schaub, planned to drive her to 
school, and thus would have contact with the monument.  
Moreover, as Doe 1’s parent, she has an interest in guiding 
her child’s religious upbringing and has standing to challenge 
actions that seek to “establish a religious preference 
affecting” her child.  Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 
70 of Cleveland Cty., 766 F.2d 1391, 1398 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Thus, Schaub 
has standing to seek injunctive relief.  
 
Schaub’s decision not to send Doe 1 to the high school 
does not deprive Schaub of standing to seek injunctive relief.  
First, injunctive relief still has the capacity to redress her 
grievances because Doe 1 could return to the high school if 
the monument were removed.13  Schaub therefore has a 
                                                 
13 Schaub also alleges that Doe 1 has expressed an 
interest in attending classes at the Northern Westmoreland 
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concrete interest in the resolution of her request for injunctive 
relief.  Second, the “principles of standing [do not] require [a] 
plaintiff[ ] to remain in a hostile environment to enforce [her] 
constitutional rights.”  Id. at 1399 (no bar to injunctive relief 
where parents who sought to end various religious practices at 
a school chose to move their children to another school 
during the pendency of the lawsuit).  For these reasons, 
Schaub has standing to pursue injunctive relief.14 
 
The decision to remove Doe 1 from the high school 
does not render Schaub’s claim for injunctive relief moot.  As 
previously stated, Schaub was not required to continue 
suffering the exact injury described in the complaint to 
maintain her entitlement to seek relief.  See Chong, 264 F.3d 
at 384; Cantrell, 241 F.3d at 678.  While there may be cases 
in which an injunction would be ineffective because the 
injurious conduct has ceased, here Schaub represents that she 
intends to enroll Doe 1 at the high school if the monument is 
removed and that Doe 1 wishes to take courses at the 
adjoining career center, demonstrating that an injunction, if 
                                                                                                             
Career & Technology Center, which is located on the high 
school campus, but that Schaub is concerned doing so would 
bring Doe 1 in contact with the monument. 
14 Since we have concluded Schaub has standing to 
seek equitable relief, we need not address the standing of the 
other plaintiffs to pursue injunctive relief.  Bd. of Educ. of 
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826 n.1 
(2002) (explaining that because one party has standing, it is 
unnecessary to address whether the other party also has 
standing to challenge the school’s suspicionless drug testing 
policy). 
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granted, could provide relief.  Thus, the request for an 
injunction is not moot. 
 
E 
 
Finally, we address FFRF’s standing.  FFRF’s standing 
is predicated wholly on the standing of its alleged member, 
Schaub.  Because we conclude Schaub has standing, we will 
remand to the District Court to determine whether she was a 
member of FFRF at the time the complaint was filed and if 
FFRF thereby has organizational standing to pursue either 
injunctive relief or nominal damages. 
 
III 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to Doe 1’s 
claims for nominal damages, reverse and remand for further 
proceedings concerning Schaub’s claims, and vacate and 
remand for consideration of FFRF’s standing and further 
proceedings concerning FFRF’s claims if the District Court 
finds FFRF has standing.15  
                                                 
15 The standing inquiry is not an assessment of the 
merits, see ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 624 
(1989), and therefore nothing herein constitutes an opinion on 
the merits. 
Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. New Kensington 
Arnold School District, No. 15-3083 
SMITH, Circuit Judge, concurring dubitante. 
 I join in the excellent opinion authored by Judge 
Shwartz.  I write separately only because I am doubtful that a 
claim for nominal damages alone suffices to create standing 
to seek backward-looking relief.  While this issue has little 
practical importance to this case, it does have broad 
consequences for our standing and mootness inquiries in 
other scenarios.  Furthermore, this appears to be the first time 
our Court has ruled on this issue.     
 Because this is a case about standing, I begin my 
discussion with the standing doctrine.  Then, because the 
doctrines of standing and mootness are closely related, and 
because there are many more cases discussing the interplay 
between nominal damages and mootness than there are 
between that of nominal damages and standing, I next discuss 
the mootness doctrine and the persuasiveness of these cases.  
After revisiting the facts of our case, I consider a few 
hypothetical scenarios that will be impacted by our standing 
decision today.  Finally, I conclude by emphasizing that 
nothing in this opinion casts doubt on the availability of 
nominal damages at the conclusion of a suit.  I only write to 
express skepticism that a claim for nominal damages alone 
would suffice to create standing or save a case from 
mootness.   
 
I.   
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 That “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately 
for each form of relief sought” is an unremarkable 
proposition.  Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000).  My uncertainty 
stems from the third requirement of standing: redressability.  
As the panel opinion points out, in order to satisfy Article III 
standing, a plaintiff must show that “(1) it has suffered an 
‘injury in fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) 
actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the 
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.”  Id. at 180-81.  Outside of quoting this test, the 
panel opinion discusses only whether there exists an adequate 
injury in fact, as that is the only prong of the standing inquiry 
that the parties themselves discuss.  Yet of course, we have an 
independent obligation to determine whether we have 
jurisdiction.  Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 
83, 95 (1998). 
 In order for an injury to be redressable, a plaintiff must 
show that she “personally would benefit in a tangible way 
from the court’s intervention.”  Warth v. Selden, 422 U.S. 
490, 508 (1975).  Steel Co. is the only Supreme Court 
decision to focus on the redressability prong of standing.  In 
that case, the plaintiff alleged that it suffered an injury – 
namely, that its members’ “safety, health, recreational, 
economic, aesthetic and environmental interests” were 
negatively impacted – due to the defendant’s failure to file 
timely and required reports pursuant to federal statute.  523 
U.S. at 105.  Assuming that this was sufficient for an injury in 
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fact, the Supreme Court walked through each of the six forms 
of relief sought by the plaintiff and determined that the 
organization lacked standing because none of these forms of 
relief redressed this injury.  Id. at 105-09.   
 First, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that 
there was a violation of the federal statute, which was 
“disposed of summarily” as there was no dispute that there 
was, in fact, a violation of the statute.1  Id. at 106.  Second, 
the plaintiff stated that civil penalties, payable to the United 
States Treasury, would redress the injury because the 
payment would provide “vindication of the rule of law,” even 
if it would not provide “reimbursement for the costs incurred 
as a result of the late filing.”  Id.  The Court rejected this 
argument because, “although a suiter may derive great 
comfort and joy from the fact that the United States Treasury 
is not cheated . . . psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable 
Article III remedy because it does not redress a cognizable 
Article III injury.”  Id. at 107.  Next, the Court concluded that 
“investigation and prosecution costs,” which were authorized 
by statute, could not create standing when it was otherwise 
absent, because “a plaintiff cannot achieve standing to litigate 
a substantive issue by bringing suit for the cost of bringing 
suit.”  Id. at 107.  Finally, the Court concluded that the 
                                              
1 While the Supreme Court had no need to delve further into 
the declaratory relief sought, it stated in Los Angeles Cty., 
Cal. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 31 (2010), that a declaratory 
judgment is a claim for prospective relief, different from a 
claim alleging past harm.   
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remaining two forms of relief sought2 – giving the plaintiff 
the authority to inspect the defendant’s records and facility 
and requiring defendant to give the plaintiff copies of 
compliance reports – were injunctive in nature.  Id. at 108.  
Such injunctive relief “cannot conceivably remedy any past 
wrong but is aimed at deterring petitioner from violating [the 
federal statute] in the future.”  Id.  Thus, if the complaint “had 
alleged a continuing violation or the imminence of a future 
violation, the injunctive relief requested would remedy that 
alleged harm.”  Id.  However, such a “generalized interest in 
deterrence” did nothing to remedy the past harm that had 
occurred.  Id.  
 In holding that the redressability prong of standing was 
not satisfied, the Court stated, “[r]elief that does not remedy 
the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal 
court; that is the very essence of the redressability 
requirement.”  Id. at 107.  Thus, even though the plaintiffs 
sought several forms of relief that might allow a suitor to 
“derive great comfort and joy” or declare that there was, in 
fact, a violation of the law, id., because none of the forms of 
relief sought would serve to compensate plaintiffs for their 
past losses, Article III standing was lacking.  Id. at 109-10. 
 The question of whether nominal damages, standing 
alone, serve to confer standing on a plaintiff has never been 
addressed by this Court, and, with one exception, it does not 
appear to have been addressed by our sister circuits.  
However, the principle appears to be the same as that in Steel 
                                              
2 The sixth form of relief sought was “any such further relief 
as the court deems appropriate.”  Id. at 105.   
5 
 
Co.: just as the “psychic satisfaction” from being told that you 
were right or by seeing a wrongdoer pay monies to the 
Treasury does not redress past harm, nominal damages do not 
serve to redress past injury.  “Nominal damages are damages 
in name only, trivial sums such as six cents or $1.”  Utah 
Animal Rights Coal. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 
1264 (10th Cir. 2004) (McConnell, J., concurring) (quoting 1 
Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies, § 3.3(2), at 294 (2d 
ed. 1993)).  If a plaintiff were seeking to be compensated for 
past harms, he would seek compensatory damages.   
 There have been three appellate courts that have 
explicitly addressed whether a claim for nominal damages 
alone would suffice for standing purposes.  First, the Second 
Circuit, in Kerrigan v. Boucher, held that a “claim for 
nominal damages, which is clearly incidental to the relief 
sought, cannot properly be the basis upon which a court 
should find a case or controversy where none in fact exists.”  
450 F.2d 487, 489-90 (2d Cir. 1971).  This holding was 
reaffirmed two years later in the two-judge concurrence in 
Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378, 
387 (2d Cir. 1973) (Timbers, J., concurring) (quoting 
Kerrigan, 450 F.2d at 489-90).  However, both of these cases 
appear to have been largely overlooked, with neither having 
been cited with great frequency.   
 Next, the Eighth Circuit, in what I consider to be a 
fairly conclusory manner, held that a claim for nominal 
damages meant that the redressability requirement was 
satisfied.  Advantage Media, L.L.C. v. City of Eden Prairie, 
456 F.3d 793, 802 (8th Cir. 2006).  The one case that it relied 
on for support of this proposition, Tandy v. City of Wichita, 
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stated that standing was satisfied because “compensatory or 
nominal damages can redress [the plaintiff’s] injury in fact.”  
380 F.3d 1277, 1290 (10th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).  
While Tandy does suggest that nominal damages alone would 
redress an injury in fact, the Tenth Circuit did not have to 
address this issue due to the presence of a claim for 
compensatory damages.3 
 In the only case where an appellate court has 
thoroughly analyzed the relationship between nominal 
damages and redressability, the Sixth Circuit in Morrison v. 
Board of Education of Boyd County, stated that “[n]o readily 
apparent theory emerges as to how nominal damages might 
redress past [harm].”4  521 F.3d 602, 610 (6th Cir. 2008).  
Thus, where the plaintiff sought “nominal damages based on 
a regime no longer in existence,” the redressability prong of 
standing was not satisfied because “[t]o confer nominal 
                                              
3 The Fourth Circuit, in Covenant Media of SC, LLC v. City of 
North Charleston, similarly suggested that a claim for nominal 
damages would suffice for standing purposes.  493 F.3d 421, 428 
(4th Cir. 2007) (noting that the claim is “redressable at least by 
nominal damages”).  However, like many of the cases that seem to 
say that a case is saved from mootness at least by nominal 
damages, the plaintiffs sought both compensatory and nominal 
damages.  See id. at 429 n.4.   
 
4 As discussed further below, the Morrison court relied heavily 
upon then-Judge McConnell’s views in Utah Animal Rights 
Coalition, which addressed the related question of whether a claim 
for nominal damages prevents a case from becoming moot.   
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damages here would have no effect on the parties’ legal 
rights.”  Id. at 611.  Instead, the entire purpose of the suit, a 
challenge to a school district policy that was no longer in 
effect, id. at 606-07, was to seek prospective relief, a fact that 
the plaintiff’s attorney conceded at oral argument, id. at 610 
(noting that counsel acknowledged that “nominal damages are 
a vehicle for a declaratory judgment”).  Allowing the suit to 
proceed to determine “the constitutionality of an abandoned 
policy—in the hope of awarding the plaintiff a single dollar—
vindicates no interest and trivializes the important business of 
the federal courts.”  Id. at 611;5  see also Steel Co., 523 U.S. 
at 107 (noting that “[b]y the mere bringing of his suit, every 
plaintiff demonstrates his belief that a favorable judgment 
will make him happier,” but that this “psychic satisfaction” 
does not redress an Article III injury).  
 Here Schaub does not seek compensatory damages, 
but instead seeks only nominal damages, where “the dollar is 
not the real objective of the litigation.”  Utah Animal Rights 
                                              
5 In ruling that nominal damages alone did not suffice for standing 
purposes, Morrison did not find itself constrained by the Sixth 
Circuit’s prior precedent “allow[ing] a nominal-damages claim to 
go forward in an otherwise-moot case.”  Morrison, 521 F.3d at 611 
(citing Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642, 646 n.2 (6th Cir. 2004), and 
Murray v. Bd. of Trs., Univ. of Louisville, 659 F.2d 77, 79 (6th Cir. 
1981)).  However, as discussed at the beginning of Part II, while 
these doctrines are closely related, the mootness doctrine is more 
flexible due in part to the “sunk costs” of litigation already 
conducted.  See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 190-92.   
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Coal., 371 F.3d at 1264 (McConnell, J., concurring).6  As 
with the request for civil penalties to be paid to the United 
States Treasury in Steel Co., Schaub seems to be seeking a 
remedy that does not provide her with any tangible benefit.  
Instead, she appears to be seeking an “authoritative judicial 
determination of the parties’ legal rights,” Id.  That is 
prospective relief, not something that nominal damages can 
redress.  Morrison, 521 F.3d at 610-11.   
 Standing alone, with the claims for injunctive and 
declaratory relief analyzed separately, I am doubtful that this 
“psychic satisfaction [can be] an acceptable Article III 
remedy because it does not redress a cognizable Article III 
injury.”  Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 107; see also N.J. Peace 
Action v. Bush, 379 F. App’x 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2010) (saying 
that a remedy of declaratory relief “would not take back the 
allegedly unlawful orders that [plaintiff] has already obeyed, 
nor would it provide any concrete compensation for the 
                                              
6 In their opening brief, Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to 
nominal damages to compensate them for “the altered conduct they 
undertook to avoid the Monument,” not for their unwelcome 
contact with the monument in the past.  Appellant Br. at 41.  This 
injury which they seek to be redressed by nominal damages was 
not present at the time the suit was filed, as Doe 1 was transferred 
to a different school district after the commencement of the suit, 
and thus would not suffice to create standing.  Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 
191 (stating that a plaintiff must have standing “at the time the 
action commences”).  Moreover, it is compensatory in nature.  
However, in their reply brief, Plaintiffs change their argument to 
one based on their past interaction with the monument.  This is the 
standing analysis that the panel opinion correctly focuses upon.    
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emotional, psychological, and physical injuries that he has 
allegedly suffered.  Indeed, it is ‘merely speculative’ that any 
psychic benefits of declaratory relief would redress the 
emotional, physical, and psychological injuries already 
suffered by the plaintiffs in this case.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  If this nominal damages claim is really one 
for prospective relief, then this analysis has already been 
conducted in the panel opinion.  See Kerrigan, 450 F.2d at 
489-90 (stating that the claim for nominal damages “is clearly 
incidental to the [declaratory] relief sought [and] cannot 
properly be the basis upon which a court should find a case or 
controversy”).  While not problematic in this case, I would be 
concerned if our retrospective standing analysis were 
considered binding on future panels of our Court in factually 
different cases, hypotheticals of which are discussed in Part 
III of this opinion.   
II.   
 Plaintiffs first raised the issue of whether nominal 
damages alone suffice for justiciability purposes in order to 
save the case from mootness if the District Court determined 
that the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were 
mooted by Doe 1’s transfer to a different school district.  
While we are not faced with the specific question of whether 
a claim for nominal damages could save a case from 
mootness, it is closely related to the issue that I raise, as the 
Supreme Court has said that “the doctrine of mootness can be 
described as ‘the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The 
requisite personal interest that must exist at the 
commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue 
throughout its existence (mootness).’”  Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 
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189 (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 
U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997)).  However, Laidlaw also explained 
that this phraseology was not entirely accurate, as there is an 
important distinction between standing and mootness.  Id. at 
190 (describing this phrase as a “not comprehensive” 
description of the relationship between standing and 
mootness).  The “[s]tanding doctrine functions to ensure, 
among other things, that the scarce resources of the federal 
courts are devoted to those disputes in which the parties have 
a concrete stake,” while the mootness doctrine involves a 
“case [that] has been brought and litigated, often . . . for 
years.”  Id. at 191-92.  While this sunk cost argument “does 
not license courts to retain jurisdiction over cases in which 
one or both of the parties plainly lack a continuing interest,” 
this is “surely . . . an important difference between the two 
doctrines.”  Id. at 192 (emphasis added); see also Cinicola v. 
Scharffenberger, 248 F.3d 110, 118 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(describing the “flexible character of the Article III mootness 
doctrine” (quoting United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 
445 U.S. 388, 400 (1980))).  Thus, while the cases involving 
nominal damages and mootness may be instructive, they do 
not necessarily dictate what our analysis should be regarding 
the sufficiency of nominal damages alone to create standing. 
 Unlike cases addressing the interplay between nominal 
damages and redressability, there are many cases that have 
addressed whether a claim for nominal damages saves a case 
from mootness.  I concede that my concerns about nominal 
damages and justiciability do not appear to be shared by the 
majority of appellate courts to address the mootness subset of 
justiciability.  However, the one case that has thoroughly 
11 
 
examined the issue expresses the same concerns that I raise 
here.  As with the standing inquiry discussed in Part I, we do 
not have a Third Circuit case directly on point, although we 
have held that a claim for nominal damages in conjunction 
with one for punitive damages is enough to avoid mootness.  
Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 314 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001).   
 Nor has the Supreme Court explicitly addressed this 
issue.  Arizonans for Official English is its one decision 
touching on the relationship between justiciability and 
nominal damages.  520 U.S. at 68-70.  In that case, the Court 
stated that the plaintiff’s attempt to wrest a claim for nominal 
damages from a general prayer for relief would not save a 
case from becoming moot.  Id. at 69-72.  It said that such 
attempts to save a case from becoming moot by asserting 
what it characterized as the “nominal damages solution to 
mootness” required, at a minimum, close scrutiny.  Id. at 69 
& n.24; id. at 69 (“It should have been clear to the Court of 
Appeals that a claim for nominal damages, extracted late in 
the day from [the plaintiff’s] general prayer for relief and 
asserted solely to avoid otherwise certain mootness, bore 
close inspection.”).  However, the Court had no reason to 
either embrace or repudiate whether a valid claim for nominal 
damages could save a case from mootness, because the party 
against whom nominal damages were sought – the state – was 
not a party to the litigation and was also immune to damages 
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Id. at 69-70.  At the same 
time, it did not explicitly hold that there was no “nominal 
damages solution to mootness.”  See id. at 69 n.24.  
 It may be that a majority of our sister circuits have 
conflated nominal damages with actual damages in holding 
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that “[a] live claim for nominal damages will prevent 
dismissal for mootness.”  Bernhardt v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 
279 F.3d 862, 872 (9th Cir. 2002); Van Wie v. Pataki, 267 
F.3d 109, 115 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating in dicta that 
“plaintiffs in election cases could avoid the potential for 
mootness by simply expressly pleading that should the 
election pass before the issuance of injunctive relief, nominal 
money damages are requested.”);7 Advantage Media, 456 
F.3d at 803 (holding that a claim was not moot because the 
plaintiff “might be entitled to nominal damages if it could 
show that it was subjected to unconstitutional procedures”).  
For example, in Bernhardt, the court examined caselaw 
making clear that nominal damages could be awarded in the 
event that compensatory or punitive damages were 
unavailable.  279 F.3d at 872.  As discussed further below, 
this is a different question from whether nominal damages 
standing alone suffice for standing purposes.  Despite 
acknowledging that “this rule [that standing can save a claim 
from mootness] has been challenged as ‘inconsistent with 
fundamental principles of justiciability,’” Morgan v. Plano 
                                              
7 However, this dicta is at odds with the Second Circuit’s case law 
on nominal damages and standing.  See Hernandez, 487 F.2d at 
387 (“Not having found a justiciable controversy permitting a 
declaration, the claim for nominal damages, which is clearly 
incidental to the relief sought, cannot properly be the basis upon 
which a court should find a case or controversy where none in fact 
exists.” (quoting Kerrigan, 450 F.2d at 489-90)).  As mentioned 
earlier, the standing requirement is slightly more rigorous than the 
mootness doctrine’s greater flexibility, which may explain the 
difference.  See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 190-92; cf., supra note 5. 
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Indep. Sch. Dist., 589 F.3d 740, 748 n.32 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Utah Animal Rights Coal., 371 F.3d at 1263 
(McConnell, J., concurring)), some courts nonetheless are 
bound by their prior precedent.  Id. at 748 (“This court and 
others have consistently held that a claim for nominal 
damages avoids mootness.”); Utah Animal Rights Coal., 371 
F.3d at 1262 (McConnell, J., concurring (“The panel was 
constrained to take jurisdiction in this case because of Tenth 
Circuit precedent holding that a claim for nominal damages 
precludes dismissal of the case on mootness grounds.”).  Most 
circuits that have held that nominal damages can prevent 
mootness reach the result with what I consider to be little 
analysis of how a claim for nominal damages would redress a 
cognizable injury in fact.  It is just possible that “the nominal 
damages solution to mootness” is nothing more than a self-
perpetuating myth.8   
 The Eleventh Circuit draws a distinction between 
claims for procedural due process, where a claim for nominal 
                                              
8 While the Fourth and Seventh Circuit have not explicitly 
addressed the issue, they have hinted that a claim for nominal 
damages alone would prevent a case from becoming moot.  See 
Covenant Media, 493 F.3d at 429 n.4 (noting that the plaintiff’s 
“suit [was] not moot because if [the plaintiff was] correct on the 
merits, it is entitled to at least nominal damages,” because the suit 
sought compensatory and nominal damages (emphasis added)); 
Kelly v. Mun. Courts of Marion Cty., Ind., 97 F.3d 902, 910 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (holding a claim moot because the plaintiff “failed to 
mention damages, not even nominal damages”).  The First, 
Federal, and D.C. Circuits do not seem to have indicated their 
inclination on the subject one way or another.   
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damages will save a claim from mootness, and other cases, 
where the case will be moot despite the presence of nominal 
damages.  In DA Mortgage, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, the 
court held that “[d]amages claims can save a § 1983 claim 
from mootness, but only where such claims allege 
compensatory damages or nominal damages for violations of 
procedural due process.”  486 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 
2007).  It draws this distinction based on the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 
477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986) (noting that the basic purpose of 
damages under § 1983 is compensatory and that “the abstract 
value of a constitutional right may not form the basis for 
§ 1983 damages”), and Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-
67 (1978) (approving the award of nominal damages for a 
violation of procedural due process when actual damages 
could not be proved).  In an unpublished opinion, the 
Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its holding that a claim for 
nominal damages saved a case from mootness only when 
there was a violation of procedural due process.  Freedom 
from Religion Found., Inc. v. Orange Cty. Sch. Bd., 610 F. 
App’x 844, 846 n.3 (11th Cir. 2015).  While this distinction is 
one that we could adopt, I am not convinced that the 
distinction between procedural due process and other 
violations is an appropriate one for justiciability purposes.  
Moreover, as discussed further in Part IV, Carey was not a 
case about justiciability and was more about the availability 
of nominal damages where other damages claims were 
ultimately not susceptible to proof.   
 As the Fifth Circuit acknowledged in Morgan, the first 
case to challenge the well-accepted view that nominal 
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damages could save a case from mootness was Utah Animal 
Rights Coalition.  In this case, the plaintiffs sought injunctive 
relief, declaratory relief, and nominal damages in an attempt 
to force the city to process their applications to protest the 
Winter Olympics.  371 F.3d at 1254 (majority).  However, 
before the District Court heard argument, the Winter 
Olympics occurred, rendering the claims for injunctive and 
declaratory relief moot.  Then-Judge McConnell9 wrote both 
a majority opinion and a concurrence because he felt 
“constrained” by Tenth Circuit precedent, which bound the 
court to hold “that a claim for nominal damages precludes 
dismissal of the case on mootness grounds.”  371 F.3d at 
1262 (McConnell, J., concurring).  Judge McConnell 
concurred so that he could explain why he felt that Tenth 
Circuit precedent was incorrect, and to urge “either an en 
banc court or the Supreme Court [to] hold that a case that is 
otherwise nonjusticiable on account of mootness is not saved 
by the mere presence of a prayer for nominal damages.”  Id. 
at 1263.   
 I consider Judge McConnell’s concurrence persuasive.  
He argues that “nominal damages were originally sought as a 
means of obtaining declaratory relief before passage of 
declaratory judgment statutes.”  Id. at 1265.  He cites to 
extensive scholarship in support of this view.  Id. (citing 
Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies: Cases and 
Materials 561 (3d ed. 2002) (“The most obvious purpose [of 
nominal damages] was to obtain a form of declaratory relief 
                                              
9 On May 5, 2009, Judge McConnell resigned his seat on the Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in order to serve as the faculty 
director of the Stanford Law School’s Constitutional Law Center.   
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in a legal system with no general declaratory judgment act.”), 
1 Dobbs, supra, at 295 (“Lawyers might have asserted a 
claim for nominal damages to get the issue before the court in 
the days before declaratory judgments were recognized.”), 
and 13A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, § 3533.3, at 266 (2d ed. 1984)).  In fact, that is the 
only reason that nominal damages were asserted in our case: 
even if the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were 
technically moot, a holding that there had been a past 
Establishment Clause violation – and that Schaub would be 
entitled to nominal damages – would have the practical effect 
of requiring the school district to take down the Ten 
Commandments monument.  Schaub is not seeking to be 
compensated for a past constitutional violation; her sole 
objective is to prevent the alleged constitutional violation 
from continuing.  See Morrison, 521 F.3d at 610 (“No readily 
apparent theory emerges as to how nominal damages might 
redress past [harm].”).   
 Instead of allowing such a claim to proceed in federal 
court, if we agreed with the District Court that the claims for 
injunctive and declaratory relief were moot, a proper result 
would be to hold that the claim is non-justiciable.  Utah 
Animal Rights Coal., 371 F.3d at 1262 (McConnell, J., 
concurring) (“Federal Courts . . . are not debating societies to 
determine whether past actions and defunct ordinances were 
constitutional.  Federal courts exist to resolve live 
controversies, to remedy wrongs, and to provide prospective 
relief.”).  As in our case, plaintiffs in Utah Animal Rights 
Coalition did not seek compensatory relief.  Thus, Judge 
McConnell would say that there is “no retrospective relief 
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[the court] could grant that might make them whole for the 
alleged constitutional violation,” and thus there would be “no 
point in deciding whether the former ordinance was 
unconstitutional on its face.”  Id.; see also id. at 1263 (stating 
that a case is not justiciable merely because “a plaintiff 
wishes to have the moral satisfaction of a judicial ruling that 
he was right and his adversary was wrong”).  As Judge 
McConnell noted, to hold otherwise would allow litigants to 
avoid mootness of claims for injunctive relief by simply 
“appending a claim for nominal damages” to the complaint.  
Id. at 1266; see Van Wie, 267 F.3d at 115 n.4 (“[P]laintiffs in 
election cases could avoid the potential for mootness by 
simply expressly pleading that should the election pass before 
the issuance of injunctive relief, nominal damages are 
requested.”). 
 Judge McConnell’s separate opinion on mootness in 
Utah Animal Rights Coalition served as the analytical 
underpinning behind the Sixth Circuit’s standing analysis in 
Morrison.  I also find this persuasive, while at the same time 
acknowledging the weight of precedent from other circuits 
that support the prevailing view.   
III. 
 None of the cases cited in our opinion addresses a 
claim for nominal damages, so none had a need to engage in 
the inquiry into past harm that the panel does.  In fact, in this 
case, Plaintiffs on appeal originally based their claim for 
nominal damages on “the altered conduct they undertook to 
avoid the Monument,” not on their unwelcome contact with 
the monument in the past.  Appellant Br. at 41.  There is a 
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simple explanation for that: the real remedy sought at the time 
the complaint was filed was the removal of the Establishment 
Clause violation and a declaration of its unconstitutionality, 
not the $1 in nominal damages.  The difficulty in concluding 
that a request for nominal damages suffices to confer standing 
for past harm is apparent when we consider this case with 
different facts. 
 Imagine a scenario in which the school district 
immediately took down the monument after Schaub 
complained of it.  Nonetheless, she still sued for nominal 
damages.  Would we say that she has standing to sue to 
remove this monument?  Following the analysis conducted in 
the panel opinion, it seems that we would have to conclude 
that, due to Schaub’s past interactions with the monument, 
she would have standing because nominal damages serve to 
remedy a past harm.  Thus, the federal courts would need to 
adjudicate the merits of this alleged Establishment Clause 
violation.  I am doubtful that this is the case because I do not 
see how nominal damages redress any past harm outside of 
the psychic satisfaction of the plaintiff being told that she was 
right.  Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 107 (holding that a remedy does 
not redress an injury merely because it allows the suitor to 
“derive great comfort and joy”); Morrison, 521 F.3d at 611 
(“To confer nominal damages here would have no effect on 
the parties legal rights.”); Utah Animal Rights Coal., 371 F.3d 
at 1263 (McConnell, J., concurring) (“It is not enough that a 
plaintiff wishes to have the moral satisfaction of a judicial 
ruling that he was right and his adversary was wrong.”).     
 Similarly, and more comparable to Utah Animal Rights 
Coalition, what if we agreed with the District Court that 
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Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief was moot?  This appears 
to be the only reason why Plaintiffs raise the argument that 
nominal damages would nonetheless preserve their claim, as 
they never argued that they had standing separate from their 
claim for injunctive relief in the District Court.  Would we 
instruct the District Court to rule on the Establishment Clause 
claim because of the presence of nominal damages?  I 
seriously question whether a “case or controversy” would 
remain.  Id. at 1270 (“If a claim for nominal damages cannot 
become moot, and is eligible for fees under § 1988 . . . 
plaintiffs may be induced to waste legal and judicial resources 
by continuing litigation when there is no longer any point to 
it.”).  While neither scenario is before us, they are not outside 
the realm of possibility.10    Indeed, they are similar to the 
                                              
10 In fact, in another case in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, the court recognized that this was an issue of 
first impression for our circuit.  It held that a “valid claim for 
nominal damages” was enough to avoid mootness even 
though it “seems ‘odd that a complaint for nominal damages 
could satisfy Article III’s case or controversy requirements.’”  
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Connellsville Area 
Sch. Dist., 127 F. Supp. 3d 283, 300 (W.D. Pa. 2015) 
(quoting Utah Animal Rights Coal.., 371 F.3d at 1257 
(majority opinion)).  On the other hand, a court in the 
Southern District of Indiana recently held that “a claim for 
nominal damages alone is not sufficient enough to maintain 
federal court jurisdiction in a case that is otherwise moot.”  
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Franklin Cty., Ind., 
133 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1160 (S.D. Ind. 2015); see also id. 
(“By allowing FFRF to proceed to determine the 
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facts of Morrison and Utah Animal Rights Coalition.  I am 
concerned that the panel opinion’s analysis will control in 
similar cases.  
IV.   
 My doubts about the panel opinion’s separate standing 
analysis of nominal damages does not question the 
uncontroversial point that a plaintiff may receive only an 
award of nominal damages for past harm.  That is a common 
occurrence when the finder of fact agrees with a plaintiff that 
her right was violated but the plaintiff has failed to show 
actual damage.  See, e.g., Carey, 435 U.S. at 266 (holding that 
nominal damages would be an appropriate remedy for a 
procedural due process violation even if the district court 
ultimately concluded that compensatory damages were 
inappropriate due to the lack of actual harm); Utah Animal 
Rights Coal., 371 F.3d at 1264 n.2 (“In some cases, the 
plaintiff may seek compensatory damages at the outset of 
trial, but the court may award nominal damages based on the 
conclusion that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s right but 
the plaintiff could not prove actual damage.”).  In fact, the 
Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff who wins only an 
award of nominal damages may be entitled to “prevailing 
party status” for the purposes of seeking attorneys’ fees under 
42 U.S.C. § 1988.  Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 116 
(1992) (O’Connor, J., providing the fifth vote concurring in 
judgment).  At the same time, Justice O’Connor said that 
                                                                                                     
constitutionality of a policy that has been voluntarily 
amended to cease illegal conduct, in hope of receiving $1.00, 
vindicates no rights and is not a task of the federal courts.”).   
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where “the plaintiff’s success is purely technical or de 
minimis, no fees can be awarded.  Such a plaintiff either has 
failed to achieve victory at all, or has obtained only a Pyrrhic 
victory for which the reasonable fee is zero.”  Id. at 117.  She 
acknowledged that sometimes nominal damages can represent 
a victory when they vindicate certain rights; but in Farrar, 
where the plaintiff won an award of $1 out of $17 million 
sought, and only from the least culpable of six defendants, 
this was not such a victory even though he had prevailed in 
showing a constitutional violation.  Id. at 120-21.  Neither 
Farrar nor Carey addressed a claim for nominal damages 
alone, without accompanying claims for compensatory relief.   
 Thus, if Schaub had sought compensatory damages 
here for any past harm, then we would have to conduct a 
backwards-looking standing inquiry.  She ultimately may not 
have been entitled to compensatory damages, and only 
recovered an award of nominal damages – like the plaintiff in 
Farrar – but that would not be a bar to finding standing.   
 Plaintiffs obviously did not seek such compensatory 
damages at the time their suit was filed because they had not 
yet made the decision to move Doe 1 to another school 
district.  However, we must address standing at the time the 
suit was filed, when only the claim for nominal damages was 
sought.  Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 190 (“[I]f a plaintiff lacks 
standing at the time the action commences, the fact that the 
dispute is capable of repetition yet evading review will not 
entitle the complainant to a federal judicial forum.”).  
Plaintiffs have provided no explanation for how nominal 
damages would redress any past injury present at the time of 
the filing of the lawsuit.   
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V.   
 For the reasons stated herein, I concur dubitante.  On 
the one hand, most courts to address the impact of nominal 
damages on a court’s justiciability analysis have held that a 
claim for nominal damages preserves a live case or 
controversy and saves a case from mootness.  However, 
nominal damages do not appear to redress any past injury.  I 
wonder if our decision will create binding precedent in our 
Court for an issue that I do not think we need to reach.  
Schaub clearly has standing to seek injunctive and declaratory 
relief.  I question the need to conduct a separate standing 
analysis for nominal damages.  Perhaps when this issue is 
squarely presented and more fully litigated – such as when a 
plaintiff brings a claim solely for nominal damages or if we 
are asked to determine whether a claim for nominal damages 
saves a case from mootness – this issue will be worthy of en 
banc consideration by our full Court. 
 
 
